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Figure 2. Extreme sexual size dimorphism.
Osedax rubiplumus. On the left, a female with a harem of males. On the right, dwarf males that
normally live in a harem around the female’s oviduct. The males are maximally around 1 mm in
length. Images courtesy of Greg Rouse.
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is a particularly spectacular case, as it
concerns the overall structure of the
body and ecological and reproductive
strategy. Yet, a hypothetical scenario
of how free-living males might evolve
from dwarf forms seems even more
tangible. There are indications that the
dwarf-male phenotype in Osedax is
a case of paedomorphosis — the
sexually mature males keep some
features of the larvae, similar to an
axolotl, a sexually mature larval
salamander. The genes for building a
body with foot and trunk and palps,
however, will not degenerate in
species with dwarf males, as they are
needed to build the female body. And
if male dwarfism in indeed due to a
switch in developmental timing,
whereby sexual maturation is
activated in a larval body, it is even
conceivable that the inactivation of
this switch could lead to fully-fledged
males, much like treatment of
neotenic axolotls with thyroid
hormone can lead to grown-
up salamanders.
Then, of course, the ultimate
question is, why the dwarf male
strategy, which seems to make so
much sense in light of Osedax’s
deep-sea habitat and ecology, wouldhave been abandoned in a species that
otherwise does not seem all that
different from its close relatives. A
clue might come from the fact that
O. priapus females are comparatively
small, so perhaps there is less
competition for resources between
the sexes. But again, that is just a
guess. Chances are, however, that
from the carcasses the bone devourers
will spit out more interesting secrets
before long.References
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Mirror TestA new study finds that rhesus monkeys display self-recognition behaviors
toward a mirror after multimodal sensory-motor training. This finding closes a
prior gap in the evolutionary continuity of animal cognition and opens new
frontiers for exploring the neurobiological basis of self-awareness.Koji Toda and Michael L. Platt
The sense of self — a unified subjective
experience of being that extends in
space and time — is a core facet of
human cognition. Whether animalsalso possess a sense of self or
whether this faculty is uniquely
human remains hotly debated. In
this issue of Current Biology,
Chang et al. [1] deploy a clever
new technique to reveal that rhesus
Dispatch
R65macaques are capable of
recognizing themselves in a mirror,
passing a hallmark test for
self-awareness they had failed in
previous studies.
Almost half a century ago, Gallup [2]
pioneered the experimental
investigation of the sense of self in
non-human animals. In his seminal
work, he first presented captive
chimpanzees with a mirror and
observed their behavior. The
chimpanzees initially threatened
their reflected images in the mirror, as
if the images represented a second,
unfamiliar chimpanzee, but after
experience with the mirror used it to
inspect and groom difficult-to-see
parts of their bodies. Gallup then
experimentally anesthetized
chimpanzees and marked their faces
with odorless red dye. After the
chimpanzees awoke, they were
presented with a mirror. The
chimpanzees tended to reach out
and touch the red spot, which was
otherwise invisible. Gallup argued
that the chimpanzees must have
recognized their faces and bodies in
the mirror and that this behavior
implied a sense of self, based on
the intuition that because humans
recognize themselves in mirrors
and connect this experience with
self-awareness, then the same must
be true for animals.
Since Gallup’s pioneering work,
the mark test has been applied to
many animals, including chimpanzees,
bonobos, orangutans, dolphins,
elephants, and magpies, which all
pass the test, and gibbons, several
Old and New World monkeys, and
crows, which typically fail the test
[3,4]. Animals that pass the test,
like chimpanzees and dolphins, are
often those that we consider
‘smart’ and have large brains for their
body size [5], validating the naive
intuition that intelligence and the
sense of self are linked [6]. Yet there
are many surprises as well. Gorillas
rarely pass the mark test [3],
despite their phylogenetic affinity to
humans, chimpanzees, and
orangutans, and magpies and
pigeons sometimes pass the test
despite their dissimilarity to humans.
Moreover, performance on the mark
test within a species, even for
chimpanzees, is often highly variable
and inconsistent [7].
This variable pattern of findings
raises the possibility that performanceon the mark test may be a less
reliable assay of self-awareness than
previously thought [4]. Animals may
fail to pass the test because the mark
is not salient or meaningful to them
or because their sensory systems
differ strongly from our own [8].
Indeed, blind people and people
with prosopagnosia — a congenital
or acquired impairment in face
recognition — cannot recognize
themselves in a mirror but are clearly
self-aware [9]. Neurological studies
also suggest that self-awareness may
not be a unitary phenomenon that is
either present or absent, as implied
by the pass/fail nature of the mark test,
but may in fact be cobbled together
from multiple subordinate
mechanisms [9].
Until now, a major gap has been
the failure of macaque monkeys to
demonstrate that they recognize their
faces and bodies in a mirror, even
following extensive experience [10].
After all, recent studies have
demonstrated that macaques show
other cognitive capacities and
behavioral biases that were once
thought to be uniquely human or
shared only with great apes, including
gaze-following [11], vicarious
reinforcement [12], hot-hand bias [13]
and metacognition [14], amongst
others. Moreover, the brains of rhesus
macaques, chimpanzees, and humans
are highly similar, with the same
cortical areas connected in largely
similar fashion, though there are some
clear differences in the sheer size of
association cortex, the frequencies
of certain cell types like von
Economo neurons [15], fiber pathways
related to language, and levels of
gene expression [16]. These
observations invite the possibility that
cognition — language aside — varies
largely in degree and not kind amongst
macaques, great apes, and humans. In
this view, failure of macaques to pass
the mark test indicates a failure of
performance rather than the absence of
self-awareness.
Chang et al. [1] demonstrate that
rhesus macaques can in fact pass
the mark test when the mark itself is
made behaviorally meaningful. First,
the authors showed that macaques
fail the mark test under standard
conditions, as reported previously.
Next, they used a mildly irritating
red laser in combination with a mirror
to train monkeys to touch a spot on
their faces for a food reward.Critically, the monkeys generalized
their behavior to a new condition
in which the laser was not irritating
and there was no food reward
associated with touching the spot
(Figure 1). Most importantly, the
monkeys further generalized to
spontaneously using mirrors to
inspect and explore hidden parts of
their bodies using mirrors placed in
their home cages, just as
chimpanzees do.
Clearly, the behaviors demonstrated
by the monkeys in this study
required extensive training. However,
the importance of experience and
learning to passing the mark test has
been noted previously [17]: human
toddlers do not pass the mark test
until 18–24 months of age [18], and
not all chimpanzees pass the mark
test [6]. Even pigeons can pass the
mark test following extensive training
[17]. These findings imply that
appropriate environmental history
and learning are required to pass the
mark test. Whether immediate,
spontaneous self-recognition by
adult humans and some chimpanzees
indicates a qualitative gap in
cognition between humans, great apes,
and monkeys remains an open
question.
The new study by Chang et al. [1]
is the first to demonstrate
experimentally that macaques can
pass the standard mark test.
Nevertheless, it has been shown
previously that macaques can learn
to use a mirror to guide their hands to
reach an out-of-sight object [10].
Moreover, a recent report [19]
showed that monkeys with prosthetic
head implants used a mirror to groom
the otherwise invisible implants,
although it remains possible that this
grooming behavior was stimulated
by somatosensory cues caused by
the implants [10]. In the work of
Chang et al. [1] somatosensory
stimulation from the irritant laser
pointer increased the salience of the
mark, thus drawing monkeys’
attention to it and initiating the
process of exploration and learning.
The results support the hypothesis
that multi-modal integration is critical
for the expression of behaviors
linked to self-recognition and
self-awareness.
These are remarkable findings.
They show at a minimum that
macaques possess a latent
capacity to recognize the spatial
M
illi
on
 y
ea
rs
 a
go
20
15
10
5
0
25
GorillaHuman Chimpanzee OrangutanBonobo Rhesus Monkey
Current Biology
Figure 1. Rhesus monkeys pass the mark test.
Chang et al. [1]. used a mildly irritating red laser in combination with a mirror to train monkeys
to touch a spot on their faces for a food reward (the inset illustrates the training method). After
that, the monkeys generalized dot inspection behavior to a new condition in which the laser
was not irritating and there was no food reward associated with touching the spot. The
monkeys further generalized to spontaneous use of mirrors in their home cages to inspect
and explore hidden parts of their bodies. Phylogenetic tree of primates indicates species
showing a capacity for mirror self-recognition. Prior studies showed that humans and great
apes pass the mark test, but macaques did not. The new study shows that rhesus monkeys
also possess the capacity for mirror self-recognition.
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between the movements of their
hands and faces and visual information
reflected in a mirror, and can use
this information to guide adaptive
behavior. At the maximum, these
findings suggest macaques actually
possess a sense of self that is no
different from that of chimpanzees,
but is only manifested in the standard
mark test when the mark is made
behaviorally relevant. Between these
two extremes lie some intriguing
possibilities with important
implications for understanding
how brains detect visuo-motor
correspondence — that
is, self-agency — and how this
process contributes to self-awareness.
If self-agency and by extension
self-awareness can be developed or
even enhanced through training,
then similar techniques could be used
to remediate disorders in whichself-agency and self-awareness are
compromised, such as schizophrenia.
Despite the medical and
philosophical importance of
self-agency and self-awareness, the
neural mechanisms mediating these
processes remain poorly understood,
in part because neurobiological
studies have been limited to analysis of
lesions and noninvasive neuroimaging
studies in humans. Current
understanding links self-agency and
self-awareness to brain regions
implicated in multi-modal integration of
somatosensory information,
interoception, and forward models of
motor planning and control [20]. The
technique developed by Chang et al. [1]
opens new avenues for neurobiological
exploration of the biological
mechanisms mediating the sense of
self in non-human animals. In so doing,
we may come to know ourselves better
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